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Abstract
This paper analyses the decision of the Obama administration to redirect its 
foreign policy towards Egypt in the wake of the Arab Spring. It attempts to 
highlight the issue of how governments deal with decision-making at times of 
crisis, and under which circumstances they take critical decisions that lead to 
major shifts in their foreign policy track record. It focuses on the process that 
led to a reassessment of US (United States) foreign policy, shifting from decades 
of support to the autocratic regime of Hosni Mubarak, towards backing his 
ouster. Specifically, the paper attempts to assess to what extent the decision to 
withdraw US support from a longstanding state-leader and ally in the Middle 
East can be seen as a foreign policy change (FPC). A relevant research question 
this paper pursues is: how can the withdrawal of US support to a regime 
considered as an ally be considered, in itself, as a radical FPC?
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Premises and the Article’s Research Problem 
The popular uprisings - dubbed the Arab Spring - overthrew long-standing autocratic rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, 
and shook the rulers in Syria, Morocco, and Jordan. In the wake of 
18 days of mass demonstrations in Egypt, the Obama administration 
took the momentous decision of advising President Hosni Mubarak 
to resign, handing the control of the country over to the military. 
The removal of Mubarak was one of the most controversial foreign 
policy decisions of the Obama administration, since the United States 
support to Egypt never had faltered ever since the time of Anwar 
Sadat. Determined to be ‘on the right side of history’, Obama put 
pressure on Mubarak to hand over power, and to begin what he 
believed to be a transition to a more democratic and stable country.
This article dwells on the issue of Obama’s risky move of 
abandoning a trusted ally, allowing an Islamist-dominated regime 
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to rise to power through democratic elections. In facing popular challenge against Mubarak, the 
US accepted to forgo a close, trusted, long-standing ally, who had consistently accommodated the 
United States´ interests, in exchange for a situation of uncertainty towards an area of the world that 
the US had regarded as vital to its interests. That change might have entailed a dramatic shift in the 
architecture of US alliances in the Arab world. The demise of Mubarak was a major turning point 
of US policy in the Middle East (Brownlee 2012,  2), perhaps one of the most significant ever since 
World War II (Diehl 2011). This change may undermine its international role in the area, as well as 
its capacity to shape and influence events, and protect its interests, as later events have demonstrated. 
The main aim of this article is to ascertain to what extent that risky decision of the Obama 
administration, demanding that Mubarak step down, did lead to a foreign policy change. Secondly, 
this paper aims to determine the extent of the actual change, from the perspective of how the 
change of leadership impacted Washington’s overall policy towards Egypt.
The theoretical foundation of this study lies within the larger field of Foreign Policy Analysis, 
and in particular, of FPC. This paper speaks to broader themes in FPA about the conditions under 
which dramatic changes in foreign policies take place; the conditions under which states take a 
bold new direction that may challenge their immediate interests, the differences and commonalities 
between large-scale, dramatic change, and less radical forms of FPC, and the implications which 
these can have in the domestic arena, as well as their external consequences. 
This paper will track the evolution of the United States´ position regarding the events of 
the Arab Spring unfolding in Egypt, from the beginning of the protests, until the downfall of 
the Morsi government in August 2013. In particular, it will zoom-in on US policy throughout 
the revolutionary period, until the fall of Mubarak (January 25 – February 11), and on the new 
US stance towards the short-lived Islamist-led regime of the Muslim Brotherhood (from June 30 
2012 to July 3 2013). With the hope that, in doing so, it will be possible to ascertain (1) how 
Washington coped with the crisis against the framework of a fast-moving and uncertain background 
scenario, especially the grim prospect of dispensing Mubarak, and (2) in what sense there was an 
actual redirecting of US foreign policy under the rule of Morsi.
The essay is organised as follows: The first section lays out the theoretical background, and 
discusses the literature available on FPC, including the approach used to analyse this episode. 
Section two explains the research puzzle that drives this case study, especially in explaining Obama’s 
change of heart in light of the traditional US policy on Egypt, and Obama’s track record on 
promoting democracy in the Arab world. The third section details the case study pertaining to the 
January 2011 crisis in Egypt, and the most relevant dynamics of the decision-making process in 
the White House. Section four discusses the process outcomes in terms of foreign policy change. 
The paper concludes with the research questions that guide this paper.
Foreign Policy Analysis and Foreign Policy Change
Foreign policy change is a narrower area within Foreign Policy Analysis, an area that is still 
developing (Alden, and Aran 2012, 92). Foreign policy can be defined as ‘a set of goals, directives 
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or intentions, formulated by persons in official or authoritative positions, directed at some actor 
or condition in the environment beyond the sovereign nation state, for the purpose of affecting 
the target in the manner desired by the policymakers’ (Cohen and Harris 1975, 383). 
Studies of the dynamics of foreign policy change gained new life with the new theoretical and 
analytical focus brought about by the end of the Cold War (Alden and Aran 2012, 92; Eidenfalk 
2009, 3; Gustavsson 1998; 1999). A number of authors have shown an interest in addressing this issue 
from very different theoretical angles (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2014; Carlsnaes 1993; Checkel 
1993; 1997; Goldmann 1988; Gustavsson 1999; Hermann 1990; Rosati et al. 1994;Rynhold 2007; 
Walsh 2006). Still, there is relatively little research on FPC (Alden and Aran 2012, 92).
Usually, states’ foreign policy is characterised by stability and continuity (Kleistra and Mayer 
2001, 383), as change is seen as disrupting: ‘[R]elations between nations are established, and progress 
based on what is understood to be patterned behaviour. When those patterns are broken, interrupted, 
or reversed, the effects can be felt throughout the system, generating greater conflict and uncertainty 
between states most affected by major changes in the status quo’ (Hermann 1990, 4; Holsti 1982, 
215;Volgy and Schwartz 1994, 24). Holsti and Rosenau have illustrated how many cases of foreign 
policy restructuring can generate wars, and major tensions in the international system. A significant 
alteration of a state’s foreign policy can entail the change of alliances, the severance of diplomatic 
ties, and the acquisition of new military capabilities (Holsti 1982, 215-218; Rosenau 1981, 44).
On the other hand, and as highlighted by Hall, in foreign affairs, foreign policy is less prone 
to change than other policy issues, because traditionally the topics are more inconspicuous for the 
public (Brenner and Hershberg 2014, 44). Another assumption in the literature that pleads for 
stability is that foreign policies tend to be rigid: once a particular policy has been implemented, the 
effect of institutional inertia and stakeholders’ interests tend to entrench it (Gustavsson 1998, 3). 
Hall also argues that policymakers usually use ‘policy paradigms’, which are particularly resistant 
to change, even amidst glaring evidence of policy failure (Hall 1993, 279). He also suggests that 
while ‘a policy paradigm can be threatened by the appearance of anomalies, namely by developments 
that are not fully comprehensible (…) within the terms of the paradigm,’ paradigms are often 
adapted to assimilate such deviations (Hall 1993, 280). 
Concurrently, Legro states that sweeping changes in FP are rare, as ‘it is difficult for individuals 
to overcome the inertia of entrenched national mentalities’ (2005, 34).  Legro’s analysis of FP 
change is also relevant in light of the framework which he employs to identify superficial levels of 
change (2005), akin to Hermann’s adjustment and programchanges. Legro employs a constructivist 
framework and focuses on policy orthodoxies, and on how ideational changedrives transformation 
in the nature of FP conduct. Legro argues that change in collective ideas evolves in two analytically 
separate stages. Policymakers embrace new ideas only when exogenous shocks spark the collapse 
of the prevalent ortodoxy (‘colapse’), and when a small number of viable alternatives are available, 
allowing the ‘consolidation’ of a new orthodoxy.
However, ‘even when ideational collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus on a replacement 
could still produce continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old orthodoxy’ (Legro 2000, 
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424). Even when policy failure and ideational colapse occur, there is no guarantee that new ideas 
will become policy. This is because, in addition to polical palatability, new policy ideas must be 
administratively and bureaucratically feasible.
Our analysis draws especially on Charles F. Hermann’s model of foreign policy change. The 
dominant scholarship deems that a FPC will take place as the result of the interaction between 
the independent (sources of change) and intervening variables (actors). FPC usually derives 
from three contexts: from regime changes or state transformations, from changes that occur 
when a government purposely decides to redirect a specific policy (Hermann 1990, 5), or from 
systemic changes. They can lead policy-makers to prepare a new assessment of existing threats 
and challenges, and to a subsequent calibration of foreign policy objectives (Doeser and Eidenfalk 
2013; Gustavsson 1998; 1999; Kingdon 1984). 
This paper focuses on an episode of abrupt foreign policy change, which is rapid, non-incremental, 
and drives a reorientation of a foreign policy strand, in opposition to more routine and progressive 
FPCs. Its denomination may vary according to the author: ‘change’, ‘restructuring’, ‘redirection’, 
or ‘adaptation’. In the case of the Obama administration’s position to discard Mubarak, this paper uses 
the term ‘foreign policy change’, but in a definitively more restricted sense than in Holsti’s definition 
as ‘the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations’ (Holsti 1982, ix).
The redirection of US policy towards a pivotal American ally takes place within a context of 
acute adversity akin to the notion of crisis. Crises give room for extraordinary political actions, 
and appear to share certain key features: they create an acute sense of threat, uncertainty, and 
hurry to fulfill (Hermann 1972, 187; Rosenthal and Charles 1989, 9). Often, one must add the 
surprise factor to all this, which increases the impact of time pressure (Hermann  1990, Rosenthal 
et al. 1989). The unsettling effect can produce different outcomes, such as changes in alliances, 
tension among states, or, in most extreme cases, warfare.
Crises also follow from what Hermann (1990, 12) has labelled as ‘external shocks’, which in 
turn follow from ‘dramatic international events’ (see also Legro 2000). Leading theoretical models 
(Gustavsson 1998) assumed that FPCs are the results of shifts in structural conditions. Because 
they are visible and unchain powerful forces for change, ‘they represent the kind of feedback that 
would trigger foreign policy system regulators for monitoring and coping with discontinuous 
change’ (Hermann 1990, 12).
One could consider the Arab Spring uprisings to be external shocks, because they led to the 
replacement of leaders, to regime changes (Hermann 1990, 12), and to three wars. Secondly, the 
revolution in Egypt duly elicited a policy position from the Obama administration, due to the relevance 
of that country to US interests in the Middle East. Furthermore, the events in Egypt sent shockwaves 
throughout the region, and were reinforced by similar occurrences in neighbouring Arab countries, 
expanding the picture of regional unrest and instability, and thus, of a mounting threat to US security.
Hermann’s contribution to the study of FPC is particularly useful for this analysis. Through 
his endeavour, he tried to address the following questions: ‘Under what circumstances do these 
kinds of change occur in which an existing government recognizes that its current course is 
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seriously inadequate, mistaken, or no longer applicable? What are the conditions under which 
self-correcting change may arise?’ (Hermann 1990, 5).
Once change becomes a reality, Hermann proposes a typology of change, through a four-level 
graduation, to help discern the depth of foreign policy change (Hermann 1990, 5-6): (1) ‘adjustment 
change’, (2) ‘programme change’, (3) ‘problem/goal change’, and (4) ’international orientation 
change’. The first three levels of change do not correspond to Holsti’s definition, mostly representing 
minor transformations, and not the dramatic, extensive alteration of the state’s orientation 
internationally. Adjustment and programmechanges represent changes at the tactical level: the 
policy gist or the policy objectives remain the same (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010, 2). 
Adjustment change is the most limited foreign policy shift, requiring only a quantitative 
change in the levels of effort and/or in the scope of recipients addressed by a policy (such as in 
the class of targets), while policies remain unchanged. 
Programme changes require an adjustment in the appropriate instruments and means associated 
with a particular policy. It most likely occurs when previous policy instruments prove ineffective 
or ineffectual under new circumstances, thus requiring new instruments of statecraft that are 
qualitative in nature (Hermann 1990, 5).
Problem/goal and international orientationchanges refer to more strategic and profound 
changes in the framing of a foreign policy issue/objective. Problem/goal changes imply that, when 
external developments recurrently challenge a shared understanding or idea, the initial policy 
or goal addressed by the policy is replaced or simply forfeited. It may arise when a new policy 
challenge calls for the definition of additional goals and roles. Thus, a distinct set of purposes 
and instruments emerge to replace or complement the existing set of roles.
International orientationchanges may consequentially lead to alterations in a country’s position 
regarding major issues of its external relations, as well as its interactions in the international system. 
This type of change is most likely to occur when a country is at a critical juncture, facing a major 
FP event, which calls for shaping new considerations about the state’s objectives in international 
affairs. Such changes may also entail - as a necessary accompaniment or result - that initial FP aims 
are reformulated or set aside, which ultimately may entail a ‘basic shift in the actor’s international 
roles and activities’ (Hermann 1990, 5-6). 
Our hypothesis is that the Obama’s administration acceptance of a regime change in Egypt 
wasan adjustment change, which maintained the basic goals unvarying. It entailed tempering or 
refining the level of effort towards the new Egyptian regime, as well as the range of recipients/targets, 
that is, the new leadership in Cairo. 
The Making of the Foreign Policy Issue: the 2011 Egyptian Crisis
The particular foreign policy issue for US policymakers discussed in this section involves the 
decision taken in response to the uprising against the Mubarak regime. The general issue arose 
from the need to take a decision: whether to bet on the reform of the Mubarak regime, or to 
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remove the Egyptian leader, prompting the beginning of an open-ended transition. Eventually, 
a strategic decision was taken in favour of a particular action (Hermann and Hermann 1989).
The Egyptian revolution followed after the popular uprising that began on January 25, 2011, 
the ‘Day of Rage’, when tens of thousands of marchers occupied Cairo’s Tahrir Square, protesting 
against Mubarak’s rule.
In the wake of the protests, the administration proceeded slowly to seriously examine the 
possibility of profound instability for Mubarak’s government in Egypt (Cooper et al. 2011). 
Through the early stages of the crisis, the Obama administration initially pursued the reform of 
the regime. As days passed, Mubarak’s regime faced increased criticism from Washington: the 
administration condemned the violence wielded against demonstrators, and called for a faster 
transition. Obama eventually came to the conclusion that stability could only be quickly restored 
in Egypt if Mubarak would depart. The swift departure of Mubarak - of his own accord - followed 
by an orderly transition to a reformed democratic system, became the preferred scenario. 
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, tried to convince the newly 
designated Egyptian Vice-President, General Omar Suleiman, to exhort Mubarak to leave office, 
so he could work out a transition government with a compact of opposition politicians, including the 
Muslim Brotherhood (Miller 2011). As the crisis in Egypt unfolded, the Egyptian military emerged 
as the most important rival power-center to Mubarak: the demonstrations seemed to swing the 
institution’s support in favour of the protesters’ demands, and against Mubarak. On January 31st, 
the military promised not to fire on any peaceful protests, recognised ‘the legitimacy of the people’s 
demands,’ and refused to resort to the use of force to disperse them (despite their protest being 
illegal under existing laws) - a sign that the Army’s support to the president was collapsing. With 
that, any remaining legitimacy of the Mubarak government suddenly crumbled. By the end of the 
day, the Armed Forces convinced the president to step down. Top military commanders allegedly 
urged the president to step down (Lilli 2016, 114; Lutterbeck 2011, 29).
On that very same day, Obama declared in a televised speech that a transition to a new 
Egyptian government should begin straight away: ‘an orderly transition must be meaningful, 
it must be peaceful, and it must begin now’ (Dorning and Goldman 2011). With Obama’s 
announcement, the policy on Egypt entered a new stage, with Obama’s carefully phrased public 
statements signalling, nonetheless, a clear desire for Mubarak to step aside.
In the following days, in face of Mubarak’s intransigence, the administration kept discussing 
a transitional government with Egyptian officials, which would be headed by the Egyptian 
Vice-President, and supported by the Egyptian military (Cooper and Sanger 2011). 
The Obama administration tried to perform a high-wire act, ‘between positioning itself “on the 
right side of history”, and not unceremoniously dumping a leader who had supported American 
policy on key regional policies’ (Miller 2011). For several days, there were discrepancies between 
the messages exchanged in private and in public declarations (News Wires 2011): it was due to 
the government’s own confusing appraisal of the situation (Miller 2011). As a result, at certain 
points, the message that came through often sounded half-hearted and muddled. 
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On February 11, Suleiman announced that the president had relinquished his office, while 
empowering the Supreme/Higher Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces (SCAF) to manage the 
state’s affairs. This outcome became inevitable when Egypt’s military leadership declared that 
it would not repress the demonstrators (Lilli 2016,113-114). For the SCAF, the intervention 
contained the protests and safeguarded its ties to the US (Brownlee 2012, 2). From Washington’s 
viewpoint, links with the Egyptian military were the main concern: their long-term interests 
rested more with the institution with which it had maintained longstanding ties, than with the 
Mubarak government (Lilli 2016, 108). For US policymakers, the Egyptian military was the 
primary source of influence over what would happen (Clinton 2014, 343-345). Continuing 
support to the Egyptian military was crucial to maintain US influence, and for an evolution in 
Cairo that could meet the US´ interests. 
Obama’s decision on February 1st to stand with the protesters and hasten Mubarak’s departure 
was taken against the advice of some of his senior advisers, led by Clinton, Biden, and Defence 
Secretary Robert M. Gates (Bennett 2016; Clinton 2014, 289). On the other hand, some of 
Obama’s White House junior foreign policy advisers regretted that Obamadid not act at all in 
2009, actually standing aside while the Iranian regime brutally crushed the Green Revolution 
in Tehran (Lizza 2011). They felt that the situation in Egypt offered a second chance for the 
democratic surge of the Arab Spring (Cooper et al. 2011).
US Policy in the Wake of Mubarak’s Demise 
In the early stages of the crisis, the Obama administration initially tried to pursue the reform 
of the Mubarak regime. Subsequently, faced with the evidence that events were in Washington’s 
control, and, to ensure a peaceful transition without dramatic breaking points, it advocated the 
changing of the guard. This seismic shift brought about a completely new reality in US-Egyptian 
relations: a democratically elected Islamist government in a friendly Arab country. The decision of 
the Obama administration to support a democratic transition ran the risk of empowering forces 
that could prove hostile to US interests (Nasr 2013,169), while side-lining the very reformers it 
wanted to support. Indeed, Obama was perceived by many analysts and Egyptians, as actually 
backing the Muslim Brotherhood’s ascent to power (Newton-Small 2013).
The result was an unwonted breakthrough for the Islamists who emerged from decades 
of persecution and being banned from politics, to acquiring unprecedented predominance in 
Egypt’spolitics. In early 2012, they were in control of the first freely elected parliament, dominating 
the committee drawing up a new constitution, and their candidate, Mohamed Morsi, won the 
June presidential elections. Egypt’s first democratically elected president remained only one year 
in power, before being pushed aside by the military on July 3, 2013 (BBC News 2013). 
Obama’s policy throughout the Morsi government was quite consistent with his pledge to 
stand ‘on the right side of history’ in supporting a democratic government. When Morsi was 
elected in June 2012, Obama called him to congratulate him on his victory, and underscored that 
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the US would keep supporting Egypt’s transition to democracy. The administration engaged in 
dialogue with the democratically elected government which it had pledged to accept, and ‘sought 
to develop a good working relationship with the new regime’ (Mandelbaum 2016, 299). When 
anti-government protesters in Egypt demanded that Morsi step down, Obama’s answer was: 
‘It’s not our job to choose who Egypt’s leaders are’ (The White House 2013a). 
By and large, the administration attempted to devise a policy towards Egypt that continued 
on the path of military and intelligence cooperation, without condoning the regime’s crackdown 
against dissents. Actually, Obama condemned the regime’s brutal crackdown on protesters (SkyNews 
2012) and sent pointed sharp messages on the need to protect minorities and to engage in dialogue 
with all opposition forces without preconditions.
Still, Obama clearly tried to support the government that emerged from the Arab Spring uprisings. 
It felt the partnership should work to facilitate the political transition, and to empower the leadership 
on its way to building a democracy. In September 2012 - just weeks after Egyptian security forces 
allowed a mob to breach the Embassy walls and replace the US flag with a black one associated with 
the Islamic State extremist movement - the administration notified Congress of its intent to provide 
emergency aid in the amount of $450 million to the Morsi government (Myers 2012). In early 2013, 
a previously scheduled transfer of F-16s went ahead, in the midst of the worst protests Morsi had faced.
Morsi proceeded to orchestrate an undemocratic power grab by granting himself broad 
powers above any court contestation, and muscle through a controversial constitution. He issued 
a temporary constitutional declaration that in effect afforded the president unlimited powers by 
placing his actions above judicial scrutiny, and significantly weakening the Egyptian judiciary’s 
oversight of the presidency (Egypt’s Independent 2012). In the meantime, the Obama administration 
provided $1 billion in debt relief, and backed a $4.8 billion International Monetary Fund loan 
to Egypt (Dagher and Bradley 2012). The Obama administration was slow to criticize Morsi’s 
increasingly autocratic rule, and his failure to address Egypt’s mounting economic woes. This 
came just days after the White House showered praise on Morsi for his role in helping broker a 
ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas, in Gaza. That was the major 
instance of a positive working relationship with Morsi (Mandelbaum2016, 299), a cooperation 
born out of necessity and driven by national interests, but where real sync emerged.
In May 2013, President Obama overrode a Congressional attempt to withhold military funding 
to Egypt, issuing a waiver authorizing the grant of aid over restrictions imposed by Congress, 
which had attempted to tie the assistance to advances in human rights. To be true, US military 
assistance to Egypt, which earnestly began after the 1979 Camp Accords, has regularly touched off 
quite bitter and lengthy debates in Congress. The administration maintained strategic cooperation 
with Egypt to enable it to respond to security threats, namely the growing terrorist militancy on 
the Sinai (The White House 2014), but also in hopes of helping to stabilize the political situation, 
and deal with a faltering economy and deteriorating governance.
In July 2013, Morsi was ousted by the Egyptian military, and was replaced by Abdel Fattah 
el-Sisi, Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces. At the time, the Obama administration refused to 
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refer to it as a military coup, mostly to circumvent its legal obligation that aid be suspended 
when the military overthrow a democratically elected government. However, faced with increasing 
pressure to take a forceful position on the bloody crackdown on dissidents, in October 2013, 
it announced that it would hold back some aid-funded military equipment, until the Egyptian 
government demonstrated progress towards democratic governance through upholding civilian 
rule (US Department of State 2013; Trager 2015). A year and a half later, the administration 
softened its stance towards al-Sisi’s government by reinstating economic aid, and releasing certain 
large-scale military systems (Trager 2015). The full resumption of military aid to Egypt was an 
admission that the policy of displeasurewith the new Egyptiangovernment’s violent repressive 
policies fell flat. The relationship returned to ‘business as usual,’ after Morsi’s brief interlude. 
Counter-terrorism, intelligence-sharing relationships, and the need to retain this strategic ally 
prevailed to restore lost trust and influence, despite concerns about the new president’s repressive 
stance on human rights.
Process Outcome: the Extent of Foreign Policy Change
In explaining the rationale for accepting foreign policy change, Hermann states: ‘For major 
foreign policy change to occur, it is necessary for authoritative policy makers to conclude that their 
prior formulation of the problem, their mode of dealing with it, or both, no longer accommodate 
information received from the environment’ (1990: 16). In order to reduce the problem, policymakers 
can either make changes in the policy intended to address the problem or change the definition 
of the problem itself (Hermann 1990, 7). Obama’s decision to press Mubarak to leave office 
corresponds to a change in the definition of the problem it faced. The predicament of whether 
to allow Mubarak’souster took a different twist: the issue was no longer about maintaining the 
Egyptian leader, but the country’s stability and US leverage throughout the process.
A point worth exploring is the actual extent of the administration’s real influence on the 
process, that is, its ability to have an impact on the ground regarding the decision to maintain 
or discard Mubarak. Was the administration the real driver of the process, or was it the Egyptian 
military and the demonstrators? With whom did political agency rest? Several analysts heavily 
criticized the administration’s lack of strategy, just reacting to events and not actually shaping them 
(Lilli 2016, 115-116). The United States´ ability to have an impact on the ground - especially of 
the sort that would salvage Mubarak’s rule - was most likely minimal by the time Obama made 
his televised speech regarding a ‘meaningful transition’ on February 1st. Lilli argues that the US´ 
role in Mubarak’s dismissal was ‘secondary’ (2016, 115-116). Arguably, Obama had to accept the 
developments on the ground - often against its preferences - and come to terms with them (Lilli 
2016, 115). As Lizza noted, that course of action represented less of an Obama’s doctrine, and 
more of a choice ‘based on a realistic assessment of the sobering facts on the ground’ (Lizza 2011). 
It could thus be argued that Obama faced a ‘non-choice’, and thus the ‘adjustment change’ 
in foreign policy was merely an instance of the administration reacting to the situation on the 
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ground in the only feasible way.1 This events-driven policy corresponds to Yetiv’s theory, applied 
to the Persian Gulf, where US policy attests to the absence of a grand strategy. They show a 
pattern of ‘reactive engagement,’ which is based on ad-hoc, improvised responses to unanticipated, 
unpredictable events and threats (Yetiv 2008, 192-197).
The administration’s overriding concern was that continued turmoil could create a power 
vacuum in the country, hampering an orderly transition. Obama’s misgivings was avoiding political 
mayhem, and effectively managing the crisis by fostering a smooth political transition (Hamid 
2012, 106). Initially, the administration held to the idea that Mubarak could survive the protests 
and oversee a reform process. Subsequently, as Mubarak digged down, the president and his 
team nurtured a Plan B: a stable transition engineered by the Egyptian military. The underlying 
assumption was that, despite the change of leadership, it would be possible to continue with the 
relationship. Therefore, it could be argued that the strength of military-to-military links between 
the US and Egypt assuaged the depth of uncertainty as regards the post-revolutionary outcome, 
militating against any drastic foreign policy change. It is reasonable to assume that having gone 
through 30 years of close relations with the Egyptian military and intelligence community, the 
US was relatively well-acquainted with the main actors who would serve as interlocutors on 
the Egyptian side in the immediate post-Mubarak situation, and would carry on protecting US 
interests (Brownlee 2012, 2).2
Critical are US links with the Egyptian military – Washington’s primary source of influence 
over what will happen. Continuing support to the Egyptian military would be crucial for US 
influence and for an evolution in Egypt that could meet the United States´ interests. Cutting off this 
aid, or threatening to do so, could be a body blow to US policy. That was why the administration 
felt that a top-down negotiated transition, led by Mubarak’s appointed Vice-President General 
Suleiman, could ensure the continuation of the US-Egyptian relationship. 
Thus, as far as Hermann’s model of FPC is concerned, Obama’s acceptance of a regime 
change in Egypt was an adjustment change. That decision required changing the level of effort 
and the kind of recipients addressed by a policy, although the basic goals remained unaltered: 
maintaining the diplomatic status quo in Egypt. The administration did not change its goals, but 
the fact is that retaining a friendly leader in power became secondary to avoiding a scenario of 
prolonged unrest and civil war. In this case, letting go of a reliable ally was a price that could be 
paid, in order to ensure a peaceful transition and avoid a descent into chaos. In fact, maintaining 
a relationship with whomever came into power, as long as mediated by the military, became 
thelowest common denominator. 
Secondly, in several rounds of consultation with his advisers and team of experts, Obama was 
assured that the Muslim Brotherhood had tempered its Islamist ideology over the years (Dueck 
2015, 78), becoming a ‘moderate’ and ‘largely secular organization’ that ‘eschewed violence’ 
1 I am indebted to one of the anonymous reviewersfor this insightful comment.
2 I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewersfor this observation.
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(Gerstein 2011; Mohammed 2011). The US Ambassador to Cairo, Anne Patterson, and high-level 
American envoys met with Brotherhood members shortly after the Revolution, and Washington 
hosted a delegation of the movement in April 2012 (Nasr 2013, 169; Sanger 2012, 332). Obama 
was determined to take a chance on a Muslim Brotherhood rise to power, hoping that it would 
follow the ‘Turkish model’, a combination of moderate Islam with democracy and capitalism 
(Nasr 2013, 176).
In this case, we concur with Hermann when he theorized a hypothetical scenario of difficult 
policy choices, whereby ‘a new set of goals will be replaced by only vague ideas about the preferred 
new direction’ (Hermann 1990, 18). Arguably, the choice for policy change carried with it a risk: 
the net result of a US push for democracy in Egypt might be the rise of an unfriendly kind of 
political Islam. In fact, many observers were wary of an Islamist dictatorship in Egypt, should the 
Muslim Brotherhood take over (Nasr 2013, 176). Fear that Egypt’s uprising would develop into 
an Islamist revolution along the lines of that of Iran in 1979 would constitute the worst possible 
scenario for both Washington and Tel Aviv. 
In terms of the level of FPC identified as adjustment, the changes related primarily to the 
kind of recipients addressed by a policy, that is, the policy effort addressed to the new regime. 
More to the point, the new policy recipients in Cairo required a policy of engagement by the 
Obama administration (Bouchet 2017, 156). In truth, there were no quantitative changes in the 
levels of effort towards the new Egyptian regime: throughout it all, the administration waived 
restrictions passed by Congress on aid to Egypt, on the basis of the United States´ national 
security interests.   Under Morsi, the administration never tied any aid to Egypt to its record 
on human rights and the rule of law. The Obama administration put no tangible pressure on 
Morsi to end his undemocratic practices. However, despite a relatively conciliatory political 
façade, Washington’s relationship with Morsi was strained. Although the administration did 
refrain from using aid to pressure Morsi to improve his record on democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law, all along it continuously stressed the US commitment to the democratic 
process in order to keep tabs on its conduct. The administration was slow to criticize Morsi in 
public when journalists and other activists were prosecuted, but it grew increasingly frustrated 
that Morsi had not listened to or responded to the voices of the people. Obama eventually 
used the 2013 State of the Union speech and the address to the United Nations to question the 
Egyptian leadership’s commitment to democracy (The New York Times 2013; The White House 
2013 b; 2013c). Overall, some tweaks of presidential rhetoric stressing support for democracy, 
plus some occasional admonition, kept the relationship intact and the aid programme free of 
meaningful democracy conditions.   
Obama took a ‘wait and see’ approach, managing the relationship on a short-term horizon 
basis. This ambivalent position can be ascertained from his statement in September 2012: ‘I don’t 
think that we would consider them an ally, but we don’t consider them an enemy ... I think it’s 
still a work in progress’ (Cooper and Landler 2012). Interestingly, the Obama administration was 
more assertive regarding the al-Sisi administration: to signal its displeasure with the removal of 
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Morsi from office in the summer of 2013, it decided to launch a lengthy review of US foreign 
assistance policy towards Egypt, and withhold the delivery of certain items of military assistance.
The case in point shows that it is possible to navigate the FPC process, and shape it in 
order to reduce the potential scope of change, and the unpredictability that the process entails. 
As suggested by Hall, while a policy paradigm can be threatened – the reliability of Mubarak’s 
rule –, anomalies that do not fit the terms of the paradigm can be ‘stretched’ or fine-tuned in 
order to incorporate them. As postulated by Legro, dramatic FP shifts rarely occur, as embedded 
mindsets and the ‘ideational inertia’ is magnified in the organizational culture of governmental 
agencies and bureaucracies.
Thus, as unpalatable and unpredictable as it might be, changing the leader was not akin to 
losing an ally altogether. As Brownlee puts it, ‘the protesters replaced a ruler but not a regime’ 
(Brownlee 2012, 1-2). The decision to acquiesce in regime change seemed feasible because the 
transition process was engineered by the military, which maintained significant political weight 
in the country’s internal dynamics, even under Morsi (Shama 2014, 224-226). The relationship 
was continued, and Washington accepted the rulers and their modus operandi. That was true for 
Morsi, and for al-Sisi, who has had a remarkably bloody rule. 
Conclusion
This paper is a case study of the Obama administration’s choice of changing its relationship 
with Egypt’s Mubarak regime, and whether it was a hazardous decision. We also examined whether 
the decision to support the regime change in Cairo brought about a fundamental reassessment 
of US foreign policy towards Egypt, shifting from decades of support to reliable autocratic allies, 
to backing political change. 
The empirical findings test the research question of whether the withdrawal of US support to 
a regime considered to be an ally can, by itself, constitute a radical foreign policy change or, simply, 
a partial reorientation. We are aware that this case study applies to US policy during the short-lived 
period of Morsi’s rule, when Egypt was undergoing transition, a process that needed more time to 
take root in order for the consequences to be more conspicuous. The actual scope of a policy change 
can best be gauged over a longer periodof time, when external consequences to the policy can be 
apprehended.Clearly, further work is needed in order to gain a better understanding of FPC theory 
building, in particular on the question of how much change constitutes real change. One cannot be 
much too quick in treating temporary changes as relevant, and much too ready to ignore the possibility 
that the status quo is unchanged, except for a substantial lessening of US leverage in the relationship. 
This studyis also thestarting point for a more thorough discussion of the instance of how a 
major power took a critical foreign policy decision. As is the case for most negotiation and crisis 
situations, crucial decisions - like the one analysed in this paper -, involve high levels of uncertainty 
about what may follow. In addition, these decisions involve value trade-offs for decision-makers, 
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especially in terms of managing complexity, accommodating competing values and interests, as well 
as various types of pressure made by several intervening actors, both domestic and international. 
The brief period of Mohammed Morsi’s presidency did represent a historic shift in foreign 
policy, as seen from Washington’s perspective. It constituted an about-face, from its longstanding 
policy paradigm of supporting ‘stability’ in the Middle East and North Africa allies - even if 
they were authoritarian -, to a policy of allowing the rise to power of ‘moderate’ Islamic political 
movements. The new policy of engagement with moderate currents of political Islam in the Middle 
East was one of the most sweeping changes in US policy to date regarding the Arab world.
Secondly, this paper aimed to determine the extent of actual change. The Brotherhood’s 
rise to power was neither calamitous, nor advantageous for US national interests. It did not turn 
Egypt into a theocracy. The Morsi government also did not terminate Egypt’s treaty with Israel, 
and it even brokered a helpful ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Gaza. The 1979 Egypt-Israel 
peace treaty remained in place, and US-Egypt military cooperation was also continued. 
This study’s empirical case points to the possibility that alteration of a major foreign policy 
track record, and replacing a close ally, may not result in dramatic FPC. In such cases, it is important 
to look, not only at what changed, but also at what remained the same across those periods.
Obama’s decision towards the Egypt of Mubarak demonstrates the ability of a policy to 
survive through a partial change (Goldmann 1988, 16). In his study on political adaptation, 
Rosenau fittingly defined it as a ‘way of coping with changes in the external environment, while 
keeping its essentials and within acceptable limits’ (Rosenau 1981, 38).
References
Alden, C., and A. Aran. Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011.
BBC News.  Egypt Crisis: Army Ousts President Mohammed Morsi, July 4, 2013. http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23173794
Bennett, J. “Gates: Obama Ignored NSC’s Unanimous Advice On Egypt To Be on The ‘Right 
Side of History”, The Daily Caller, March 17, 2016. http://dailycaller.com/2016/03/17/
former-secdef-obama-ignored-unanimous-national-security-team-because-he-wanted-to-be-
on-the-right-side-of-history/#ixzz4DQVxyeUt)
Blavoukos, S., and D. Bourantonis. “Identifying Parameters of Foreign Policy Change: An Eclectic 
Approach”, Cooperation and Conflict, 49, no. 4 (2014): 483-500. 
Blavoukos, S., and D. Bourantonis. “Accounting for Foreign Policy Change: The Role of Policy 
Entrepreneurs”, Paper prepared for the SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on IR Stockholm, 
September 9-12, 2010.
Bouchet, N. “Hard Choices in Democracy Promotion: Obama and Egypt. In The Obama Doctrine: 
A Legacy of Continuity in US Foreign Policy?, edited by M.Bentley, and Jack Holland, 150-163. 
London: Routledge, 2017.
Changing foreign policy: the Obama Administration’s decision to oust Mubarak
Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 60(1): e020, 2017 Pinto Arena  
14
Brenner P., and E. Hershberg. “Washington”s Asia-Pacific Response to a Changing Hemispheric 
Order”. Pensamiento Propio 19, no 39 (2014): 139-162.
Brownlee, J. Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US-Egyptian Alliance Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012.
Carlsnaes, W. “On Analyzing the Dynamics of Foreign Policy Change: A Critique and 
Reconceptualization”. Cooperation and Conflict 28, no. 1 (1993): 5-30. 
Checkel, J. “Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution”. World Politics 
45, no. 2 (1993): 271-300.
Checkel, J. T. Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the 
Cold War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. 
Clinton Hillary Rodhan.  Hard Choices. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014.
Cohen, B. C., and S. C. Harris. “Foreign Policy”. In: Handbook of Political Science, edited by F. 
I. Greenstein, and N. W. Polsby, vol. 6, 381-437. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975. 
Cooper, H., and D. E. Sanger. “White House and Egypt Discuss Plan for Mubarak’s Exit”. 
The New York Times,  February 3, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/04/world/
middleeast/04diplomacy.html?pagewanted=all
Cooper H., and M. Landler. “Spotlight Is on Libya, but Bigger Challenge for White House May Lie 
in Egypt”. The New York Times, September 12, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/13/
world/middleeast/egypt-not-libya-may-be-bigger-challenge-for-white-house.html
Cooper, H., M. Landler, and D. E. Sanger. “In U.S. Signals to Egypt, Obama Straddled a Rift”. 
The New York Times, 12 February 12, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/world/
middleeast/13diplomacy.html?pagewanted=all
Dagher, S., and M. Bradley. “Morsi Tries to Calm Egypt After His Edict”. The Wall Street Journal, 
November 26, 2012. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873244693045781433
2302192400
Diehl, J. “Obama is Lagging on The Arab Spring”. The Washington Post. 11 December 11, 2011. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-lagging-on-the-arab-spring/2011/12/08/
gIQApQzCoO_story.html
Doeser F., and J. Eidenfalk. “The Importance of Windows of Opportunity for Foreign Policy 
Change”. International Area Studies Review 16 no. 4 (2013); 390-406. 
Dorning, M., and J. Goldman. “Obama Tells Mubarak Egypt”s Transition to New Government 
‘Must Begin Now’“. Bloomberg, February 1, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
02-01/obama-seeks-to-support-protesters-without-repudiating-mubarak.html
Dueck, C. The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Egypt´s Independent. (2012). “Morsi Issues New Constitutional Declaration”. November 22. 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/morsy-issues-new-constitutional-declaration
Eidenfalk, J. A Window of Opportunity? Australian Foreign Policy Change towards East Timor 1988-
99 and Solomon Islands 2003. Ph. D thesis, School of History and Politics, Faculty of Arts, 
University of Wollogong, 2009. 
Changing foreign policy: the Obama Administration’s decision to oust Mubarak
Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 60(1): e020, 2017 Pinto Arena  
15
Gerges, F. Obama and the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment? New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012.
Gerstein, J.  (2011). “DNI Clapper Retreats from ‘Secular’ Claim on Muslim Brotherhood”, 
Politico, October 2. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2011/02/dni-clapper-
retreats-from-secular-claim-on-muslim-brotherhood-033259#ixzz4LS2JQxJL.
Goldmann, K. Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: The Problems and Possibilities of Détente. 
New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1988.
Gustavsson, J. How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change? Cooperation and Conflict 34, 
no. 1 (1999): 73-95.
Gustavsson, J. The Politics of Foreign Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC 
Membership. Lund: Lund University Press, 1998.
Hall, P. A. “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking 
in Britain.” Comparative Politics 25, no. 3 (1993): 275-96. 
Hamid, S. Prioritizing Democracy: How the Next President Should Re-Orient U.S. Policy in the 
Middle East. Brookings, 20 June 20, 2012. https://www.brookings.edu/research/prioritizing-
democracyhow-the-next-president-should-re-orient-u-s-policy-in-the-middle-east/
Hermann, C. F. “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy.” 
International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (1990): 3-22. 
Hermann, C. F. “Threat, Time, and Surprise: A Simulation in International Crisis.” In International 
Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research, edited by C. F. Hermann, 187-214. New York: Free 
Press, 1972.
Hermann, M. G., and C. F. Hermann. “Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: 
An Empirical Inquiry.” International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1989): 361-88. 
Holsti, K. J., ed. Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World. London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1982.
Kingdon J. W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984.
Kleistra, I., and I. Mayer. “Stability and Flux in Foreign Affairs: Modelling Policy and Organizational 
Change.” Cooperation and Conflict 36, no. 4 (2001): 381-414. 
Legro, J. W. Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2005.
Legro, J. W. “The Transformation of Policy Ideas.” American Journal of Political Science 44, 
no. 3 (2000): 419-32. 
Lilli, E. New Beginning in US-Muslim Relations: President Obama and the Arab Awakening. NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
Lizza, R. “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama”s Foreign Policy”, The 
New Yorker, May 2, 2011. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/02/110502fa_fact_
lizza#ixzz1M2LngelX
Lutterbeck, D. Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces Between Openness and Resistance. Geneva: 
DCAF, 2011.
Changing foreign policy: the Obama Administration’s decision to oust Mubarak
Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 60(1): e020, 2017 Pinto Arena  
16
Mandelbaum, M. Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post Cold-War Era. NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2016.
Miller, J. “American Influence Rapidly Waning in Egypt”, NewsMax,  February 2, 2011. http://
www.judithmiller.com/8713/american-influence-egypt
Mohammed, A. “U.S. Shifts to Closer Contact with Egypt Islamists, Reuters”. Reuters, June 30, 
2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-egypt-brotherhood-idUSTRE75T0GD20110630
Myers, S. L. “U.S. Move to Give Egypt $450 Million in Aid Meets Resistance”, The New York 
Times, 28 September 28, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/world/middleeast/
white-house-move-to-give-egypt-450-million-in-aid-meets-resistance.html?_r=0
Nasr, V. Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat. New York: Doubleday, 2013.
News Wires. “US Envoy Says Mubarak “Must Stay” To Steer Transition”, France 24, February 
6, 2011. http://www.france24.com/en/20110205-us-envoy-wisner-says-mubarak-must-stay-
steer-transition-egypt
Newton-Small, J. “Does Obama Support the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt?”, Time, August 23, 
2013. http://swampland.time.com/2013/08/23/does-obama-support-the-muslim-brotherhood-
in-egypt/
Rosati, J. A., M. W. Sampson III, and J. D. Hagan. “The Study of Change in Foreign Policy”. In: 
Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change, edited by J. A. Rosati, 
J. D. Hagan, M. W. Sampson III, 3-21. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994.
Rosenthal, U., P.  T. Hart, and M. T. Charles. “The World of Crises and Crisis Management”. 
Coping with Crises. The Management of Disasters, Riots and Terrorism, edited by U. Rosethal, 
M. T. Charles and P. T. Hart, 3-33. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1989. 
Rosenau, J. N. The Study of Political Adaptation. NY: Nichols, 1981.
Rynhold, J. “Cultural Shift and Foreign Policy Change: Israel and the Making of the Oslo Accords.” 
Cooperation and Conflict 42, no. 4 (2007): 419-40. 
Sanger, D. E. Confront and Conceal Obama”s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power. 
New York: Crown, 2012.
Shama, N. Egyptian Foreign Policy From Mubarak to Morsi: Against the National Interest. Abingdon, 
Oxon: Routledge, 2014.
Sky News. “Egypt: ‘Concerned’ Obama Calls Morsi”. Sky News, December 7, 2012. http://news.
sky.com/story/egypt-concerned-obama-calls-morsi-10461561
The New York Times. “Obama”s 2013 State of the Union Address”, February 12, 2013. http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/us/politics/obamas-2013-state-of-the-union-address.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Remarks by President Obama and President 
Kikwete of Tanzania”. Paper presented at Joint Press Conference, State House”, Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, July 1, 2013a. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/01/remarks-
president-obama-and-president-kikwete-tanzania-joint-press-confe 
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Remarks by President Obama in Address to 
Changing foreign policy: the Obama Administration’s decision to oust Mubarak
Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 60(1): e020, 2017 Pinto Arena  
17
the United Nations General Assembly”. The White House, September 24, 2013b.  https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-
united-nations-general-assembly
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Readout of the President”s Meeting with 
the National Security Council Regarding the Situation in Egypt”. The White House,July 
6, 2013c. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/the-press-office/2013/07/06/
readout-president-s-meeting-national-security-council-regarding-situatio
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Remarks by the President 
at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony, U.S. 
Military Academy-West Point, New York”. The White House, May 28, 2014. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-
military-academy-commencement-ceremony 
Trager, E. “Obama Wrecked U.S.-Egypt Ties”. The National Interest, April 8, 2015. http://
nationalinterest.org/feature/obama-wrecked-us-egypt-ties-12573
U.S. Department of State. Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on U.S. 
Assistance to Egypt. Washington, D. C., October 9, 2013. 
Volgy, T. J., and J. E. Schwarz. “Foreign Policy Restructuring and the Myriad Webs of Restraint”. In 
Foreign Policy Restructuring, edited by Rosati, Hagan and Sampson III H. Rosati, J. D. Hagan, 
and M. W. Sampson III, 22-42. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1994.
Walsh, J. I. “Policy Failure and Policy Change: British Security Policy after the Cold War.” 
Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 4 (2006): 490-518. 
Yetiv, S. H. The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972–2005. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008.
